'I Haven't Suffered Doubt'
Bush wanted to invade Iraq. What's striking, Bob Woodward's new book reports, is how little he discussed it with anyone
 David Hume Kennerly / Getty Images for Newsweek Hunger
for war? Woodward's book says Bush, shown here with military leaders
after the commencement of fighting in Iraq, urged the military to
prepare for conflict there just months after September 11 | |
April
26 issue - It was Monday, Jan. 13, 2003, and President George W. Bush
had just told his secretary of State, Colin Powell, that he was going
to war in Iraq. "You know you're going to be owning this place?"
inquired Powell. According to Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward's
new book, "Plan of Attack," Powell "wasn't sure whether Bush had fully
understood the meaning and consequences of total ownership." No matter.
Bush said something to the effect of "I think I have to do this," and
Powell, in essence, saluted and carried on. The whole conversation took
12 minutes.
That's
what passed for debate in the Bush war cabinet, at least as the White
House is depicted by Woodward. Early press accounts about Woodward's
latest behind-the-scenes narrative suggested that Bush kept even his
closest advisers in the dark about his decision to go to war because he
was afraid of leaks. The real news, however, is not that Bush was
secretive about his war planning, but rather that there was so little
consideration of the consequences. In Woodward's telling, Bush was
deeply involved in the details of the invasion plans from the moment he
first grabbed Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's elbow in November
2001 and asked, "What kind of war plan do you have for Iraq?" But at no
time did the president sit down with his war cabinet and debate whether
the war on Iraq would distract from the war on terror—or whether the
risk of postwar Iraq's becoming a failed state outweighed the reward of
getting rid of Saddam Hussein. Woodward,
Washington's premier investigative reporter since he and his colleague
Carl Bernstein broke the Watergate story more than 30 years ago, has
not lost his knack for opening up otherwise secretive government
officials. (When Woodward calls, some Washington insiders anxiously
joke, "you play or you pay.") While he does not name sources, Woodward
apparently had access to all the main players and interviewed Bush for
more than three hours. Woodward was criticized by some for painting too
rosy a portrait of the president as a resolute and bold commander in
chief in "Bush at War," his 2002 book about the president and his top
advisers in the wake of 9/11. The picture that emerges this time is
less flattering. In Woodward's portrait,
President Bush is single-minded, and possibly simple-minded, in his
resolve. He seems to have relied more on divine guidance than the
considered opinions of his top advisers. Bush told Woodward that as he
approached the final decision to go to war, "I was praying for strength
to do the Lord's will ... I'm surely not going to justify war based on
God. Understand that. Nevertheless, in my case I pray that I be as good
a messenger of His will as possible." In
the months after 9/11, Woodward writes, Bush was obsessed with the
threat of another attack. The president's fears peaked in late November
2001, when British intelligence ran a sting operation on a Pakistani
atomic expert who was ready and willing to sell plans for a nuclear
weapon or a "dirty bomb" to Islamic extremists. Although Woodward's
just-the-facts narrative doesn't put it this way, the implication is
that Bush couldn't very well attack Pakistan, America's new ally in the
war on terror. But Bush could go after Saddam, who (Bush believed) had
weapons of mass destruction and a willingness to share them or use
them. Bush did not want to play "small ball," he told his speechwriter
Michael Gerson. He wanted to strike pre-emptively. Hence Bush's "Axis
of Evil" State of the Union Message in January 2002. (The inclusion of
North Korea and Iran was mostly cover for Bush's secret war planning,
writes Woodward.)
Bush
was so free of doubt about going to war that he didn't even ask most of
his top advisers what they thought. Bush explained that he already knew
that Vice President Dick Cheney was gung-ho, and he decided not to ask
Powell or Rumsfeld. "I could tell what they thought," Bush told
Woodward. "I didn't need to ask them their opinion about Saddam Hussein
or how to deal with Saddam Hussein." Rumsfeld told Woodward that he
couldn't recall whether Bush had ever asked him, "Do you think I should
go to war?" Instead, Bush appears to have
been increasingly drawn into Rumsfeld's relentless search for a plan of
attack that would be fast and require fewer troops than Operation
Desert Storm in 1991. At first the Pentagon's "Op Plan 1003" required
400,000 men and six months just for the buildup. After 15 months of
whittling and rejiggering, Rumsfeld and Gen. Tommy Franks of CENTCOM
had fashioned an invasion plan that required only 150,000 men. At a
private meeting, Rumsfeld polled his top generals and advisers to ask
how long the war would take. The estimates ranged from seven days
(Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz) to about a month (Gen.
Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs).
 |
Khue Bui for Newsweek Not-so-close
consultation: In Woodward's book, Secretary of State Colin Powell is
cut off from key decision-making and national-security adviser
Condoleezza Rice appears ineffective and weak
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From
the State Department, Secretary Powell, a former chairman of the Joint
Chiefs (and a major source for Woodward in two earlier books, "The
Commanders" and "Bush at War," and, presumably, this one), worried that
not enough attention was being paid to the war's aftermath. In August
2002 Powell warned the president, "You are going to be the proud owner
of 25 million people. You will own all their hopes, aspirations and
problems. You'll own it all." Privately, writes Woodward, Powell and
his top deputy, Richard Armitage, "called this the Pottery Barn rule:
You break it, you own it." Bush brushed off Powell's cautions. The next
day the president ordered his military commanders to step up their war
plans and left for vacation in Texas.The
secretary of State felt cut out by the White House hawks. He sensed an
undercurrent of competition with the president, who, Powell said, put
him in "an ice box." Powell "soldiered on" for Bush, Woodward writes,
but barely spoke to Cheney. In Woodward's telling, Powell was
increasingly disappointed by the veep. "Powell
thought that Cheney had the fever," Woodward writes. "The vice
president and Wolfowitz kept looking for the connection between Saddam
and 9/11. It was a separate little government that was out
there—Wolfowitz, [Vice President Cheney's chief of staff, I. Lewis
(Scooter)] Libby, [Under Secretary of Defense Douglas] Feith and
Feith's 'Gestapo office,' as Powell privately called it. He saw in
Cheney a sad transformation. The cool operator from the first gulf war
just would not let go. Cheney now had an unhealthy fixation."
Missing
in action through much of "Plan of Attack" is Bush's national-security
adviser, Condoleezza Rice. Armitage, Powell's No. 2 and close friend,
was contemptuous of Rice. "He believed that the foreign-policy-making
system that was supposed to be coordinated by Rice was essentially
dysfunctional," writes Woodward. A blunt-spoken former Navy SEAL,
Armitage criticized Rice to her face. When a Washington Post article
later echoed the Armitage critique, Rice angrily complained to Powell.
"You can blame Rich if you want," Powell replied, but "Rich had the
guts to talk to you directly about this." According to Woodward,
"Powell thought that Rice was more interested in finding someone to
blame for the public airing of the problem than in fixing it." Rice
apparently saw her role as Bush's private adviser, not a referee
between clashing titans in the cabinet. But here, too, she failed,
according to Woodward: "Given her closeness and status with Bush, if
anyone could have warned the president to moderate his own categorical
statements about WMD, it was Rice." The
official most likely to be embarrassed by "Plan of Attack" is CIA
Director George Tenet. It was Tenet, as much as anyone, who convinced
Bush that the president could safely tell the public that Iraq had WMD.
On Dec. 21, 2002, Tenet and Deputy Director for Intelligence John
McLaughlin briefed Bush, Cheney and Rice in the Oval Office. McLaughlin
set up a slide show on the agency's top-secret evidence that Saddam
possessed WMD. When he was finished, there was "a brief moment of
silence," writes Woodward: " 'Nice try,'
Bush said. 'I don't think this is quite—it's not something that Joe
Public would understand or would gain a lot of confidence from.' ...
Bush turned to Tenet. 'I've been told all this intelligence about
having WMD and this is the best we've got?' From the end of one of the
couches in the Oval Office, Tenet rose up, threw his arms in the air.
'It's a slam dunk!' the DCI said. Bush pressed. 'George, how confident
are you?' Tenet, a basketball fan who attended as many home games of
his alma mater Georgetown as possible, leaned forward and threw up his
arms again. 'Don't worry, it's a slam dunk!' " Later,
when the invasion was over, Tenet acknowledged to associates that the
CIA should have stated upfront in the National Intelligence Estimate
that the evidence was "not ironclad, that it did not include a smoking
gun," writes Woodward. (In a revealing scene, Woodward describes
Michael Hayden, the director of the National Security Agency,
explaining the uncertainties of intelligence to his wife as they wash
the dishes. "If it were a fact," says Hayden, "it wouldn't be
intelligence.")
"Plan
of Attack" has echoes of "The March of Folly," Barbara Tuchman's 1984
book about how the United States stumbled into Vietnam. The CIA became
a force pushing for war in part for perverse bureaucratic reasons,
Woodward's book suggests. Asked if it can depose Saddam by covert
action, the CIA says no—but that its spies could support a regular
military invasion. Woodward describes CIA case officers sneaking into
Iraq carrying briefcases with millions of dollars to buy local spies.
The spooks handed out so many $100 bills that a Kurdish leader had to
ask them to bring fives and 10s. "The $100 bills had caused extreme
inflation," Woodward recounts. "It seemed even a cup of coffee was
going for $100 because no one could make small change." The
CIA base chief—"Tim"—recruited 87 Iraqi agents, collectively code-named
DB/ROCKSTARS. Each "rock star" was given a satellite phone. One agent
was caught and forced to confess on state TV. Waving a satellite phone,
a man in an Iraqi Army uniform announced that "anyone caught with one
of these was a dead person and all his brothers and his father would be
killed too." The CIA never heard again from 30 of the 87 phones. As
the months passed, CIA headquarters increasingly pushed the White House
to go to war before other agents could be rolled up. Woodward enjoyed
remarkable access to CIA sources. In compelling detail, he recounts the
role played by the CIA on the first night of the war.
 | David Hume Kennerly / Getty Images for Newsweek Secret
agenda: Woodward says Bush pulled Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
aside in November, 2001 asking 'What kind of war plan do you have for
Iraq?'
|
The
story is an object lesson in the elusiveness of good intelligence. From
his hut in northern Iraq, Tim messaged Langley that one of his assets
in Baghdad was reporting that Saddam and his two sons were staying at a
farm in Dora, a suburb. The "rock stars" cased the place, even
measuring the locations and size of Saddam's bunker. Bush and his war
cabinet, including Rumsfeld, Cheney and Powell, hastily convened at the
White House to consider an airstrike to "decapitate" the Iraqi
leadership. After some back-and-forth over the potential for civilian
casualties, Bush kicked everyone out of the Oval Office but Cheney.
"This is the best intelligence we've had yet on where Saddam's
located," Cheney told the president, according to Woodward. "I think we
should go for it."At 7:12 that evening,
Bush called back his advisers and said, "Let's go." (In his omniscient
narrator's voice, Woodward writes: "Powell noted silently that things
really didn't get decided until the president had met with Cheney
alone.") Within a few hours, around midnight, Tim was reporting back
that one of Saddam's sons had stumbled from the rubble shouting, "We've
been betrayed," and shot one of the "rock stars" in the knee. The other
son was bloodied and disoriented. "Saddam had been injured, according
to a ROCKSTAR eyewitness, and had to be dug out of the rubble. He was
blue. He was gray. He was being given oxygen," Woodward relates. "At
4:30 a.m. Tenet called the Situation Room and told the duty officer,
'Tell the president we got the son of a bitch'." Bush was not awakened,
however, and by the time he got to the Oval Office that morning, it
appeared that Saddam was still alive. Some
five days later, Tim made his way down to Baghdad and clandestinely
visited the Dora farm. There were craters from the American bombs, but
no bunker, or any hint of one. The CIA man eventually tracked down some
of his "rock star" agents who had reported that night. Their wives said
they had been tortured, their fingernails pulled out. Tim didn't know
what to believe, writes Woodward. The spymaster still doesn't know if
Saddam and his sons were at Dora that night, or whether the whole thing
was a hoax. In his interview with Woodward,
conducted over two days in December of last year, Bush displayed no
second thoughts about Iraq's postwar miseries or the failure to turn up
any WMD. "I haven't suffered doubt," he told Woodward. When the
author—quoting Bush's political adviser Karl Rove—suggested that "all
history gets measured by outcomes," Bush "smiled," reports Woodward. "
'History,' he said, shrugging, taking his hands out of his pockets,
extending his arms out and suggesting with his body language that it
was so far off. 'We won't know. We'll all be dead'."
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