During congressional hearings held earlier this summer, a
leading advocate of higher education was forced to deny that Edward
Said’s influential work Orientalism (1978), is being regularly
taught in American universities. In the climate of intimidation
hanging over US academic institutions in the post-Sept. 11, 2001
era, many other academics will be forced to repeatedly disavow
Said, and the cock has not crowed yet. As Said’s critics agree with
his admirers that he has single handedly effected a revolution in
Middle Eastern studies in the US, these denials remain unconvincing.
That is why these critics wanted government intervention to reverse
the “Said revolution,” arguing that US tax dollars were being pumped
into universities to subsidise anti-American scholars who had
crowded out the “good” scholars from the field.
“For two decades now,” argues one fervent critic, “ever since
America’s programs in Middle Eastern Studies were taken over by
Edward Said’s post-colonial studies paradigm, the American academy
has been busy undermining America’s security, not enhancing it.”
“Where are the professors,” lamented another, “with a strong sense
of the national interest, lots of knowledge acquired in the field,
good intelligence connections, a willingness to recruit their
students, and an eagerness to serve in times of war? No such person
exists in Middle Eastern studies.” And all this because Said has
“browbeaten” scholars into submission to his warped “Stalinist”
vision.
Said had indeed deployed weapons of intellectual mass destruction
against that archaic and jaundiced orientalist paradigm, but if he
had a militia and a secret police force which he had used to force
Middle East departments to teach his work, then he and his enforcers
had kept this army completely hidden from view. What was most
remarkable about Said’s feat, in fact, was that he had undertaken
his assault on orientalism from a position of triple marginality:
being of foreign origin (and a Palestinian at that), a left-wing
radical and an outsider to the discipline.
However, those seeking to undo his work are certainly bringing in
the cavalry. Bernard Lewis, the epitome of the traditional
orientalist, is now recognized as the favorite Middle East expert in
the While House and, even more important, in the Pentagon. Last
year, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz praised Lewis who
he said had taught him and his colleagues “how to understand the
complex and important history of the Middle East and use it to guide
us where we will go next to build a better world for generations”
Wolfowitz, it is to be recalled, is the chief architect of the
administration’s now troubled Iraq campaign, which is supposed to be
a textbook operation inspired by the orientalist paradigm and guided
by Lewis and his disciples, and some sympathetic anti-Said scholars
of Muslim origin, such as Fouad Ajami, Kanan Makiyya and Farid
Zakaria. It is notoriously difficult to deduce policy prescriptions
from the confusing and self-contradictory analyses offered by Lewis
in such works as What Went Wrong (2001), said to be a required
reading for the US military. But Lewis and his disciples make up for
that by direct recommendations, often in private, in meetings with
top officials. His prescriptions call for a direct recolonization of
the Arab world, while disregarding Arab public opinion, including
that of the so-called moderates who support America. The Arabs will
always be ruled by tyrants, he told a Pentagon briefing recently, so
we better make sure that they are friendly ones. Arab anger against
America has nothing to do with its policies, so the US must not try
to appease the Arabs by leaning on Israel or by reversing some of
its more belligerent and insensitive policies in the region.
Lewis and his fellow orientalists are preaching to the converted in
Washington these days. Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz had earlier joined him
in writing a letter to former President Clinton in February 1998
calling for the invasion of Iraq. (One perceptive commentator said
that the Lewis and co. epistle came out one day after Osama bin
Laden’s declaration of jihad against the Jews and Crusaders.)
Only after having secured the acquiescence of the executive and the
military have the orientalists turned their attention to “reforming”
academia, most probably by deploying the Third Infantry Division to
places such as Columbia University, already described by one of
Lewis’s most faithful disciples as “Bir Zeit on the Hudson.” Another
prescription, also favored by this same disciple, is to have
academic programs vetted by “an interagency group which would
include representatives of the State Department, the Defense
Department, the CIA, and other agencies like Homeland Security.”
Meanwhile the debate over Middle Eastern studies has now shifted to
a slinging match about who can serve American national interest
better, the old antiquated orient lists or the modern more up to
date scholars?
Even Said’s admittedly harsh indictment of the orientalism could not
have envisaged such a caricature. Said has merely accused the
discipline of subtle collusion with imperialism by internalising and
reproducing prevalent prejudices and stereotypes which disregarded
the complexity of realities on the ground. The new resurgent
orientalism does not even put up the pretence of scholarly
detachment or search for truth. Not only are its proponents eager to
work for the CIA and Pentagon, preferably on the front line of
recolonization, but it also wants to bring the CIA and the army into
the classroom. The argument is no longer about what the student
should be taught, but about what they should not be taught. Students
should not be permitted to read Said, or Robert Fisk or Arundhati
Roy. And above all, Middle East scholars must be discouraged from
learning Arabic. The new colonial power which hopes to encounter its
first major success in Iraq is one which does not apparently believe
that knowledge is power but it certainly hopes that ignorance is.
Like Karl Marx, they also believe that in the Middle East, the
weapon of criticism must now be replaced with the criticism of
weapons. If the Middle East does not conform to its description in
orientalism texts, then why not “bomb it into shape ” We will have
to wait and see how this prescription works itself out in Iraq. The
omens from Baghdad and Basra do not look too good for a revived
orientalism.
Abdelwahab El-Affendi is a senior research fellow at
the Center for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster. He
wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR
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